Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Authors	Participants	Study Approach	Main findings
		Selective trust in children	
Barth *et al.* (2014)	3- to 4-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds (n=45; 50)	Two experiments	By age 3, children track a speaker's record of past accuracy and use it as a cue to current reliability. By age 4, children's trust in speaker testimony spreads to members of a previously accurate speaker's group.
Bascandziev & Harris (2014)	3- to 5-year-olds (n=32)	Experiment	Children were more likely to endorse names provided by the person with the more attractive face.
Bascandziev & Harris (2016)	4- and 5-year-olds (n=132)	Experiment	Children's selective trust was biased by the informant's attractiveness.
Baumann *et al.* (2023)	3-year-olds (n=50) and 5-year-olds (n=45); 3-year-olds (n=43) and 5-year-olds (n=46)	Two experiments	It was consistently found that 3-year-old children equally endorsed the labels provided by the robot and the human, but 5-year-old children learned significantly more from the competent robot. It is concluded that by 5 years of age, pre-schoolers show a robust sensitivity to epistemic characteristics (e.g., competency), but that younger children's decisions are equally driven by the animacy of the informant.
Bernard *et al*. (2016)	3- to 5-year-old (n=74; 67)	Two experiments	Three- to 5-year-old children significantly tended to endorse the testimony of the dominant (physical or decisional power) over that of the subordinate, suggesting that pre-schoolers take dominance into account when evaluating testimony.
Bernard *et al.* (2012)	3- to 5-year-olds (n=73; 74; 77)	Three experiments	Older children, but not 3-year-olds, chose to believe statements using the connective "because" to link the argument, and they performed significantly better than 3-year-olds.
Bernard *et al.* (2014)	3- to 5-year-olds (n=81; 78; 67)	Three experiments	Four and 5-year-old children, but not 3-year-olds, are more likely to endorse a fluent statement than a dysfluent one.
Birch *et al.* (2008)	3- to 4-year-olds (n=40; 40)	Two experiments	Three- and 4-year-olds favour a previously accurate individual when learning new words and learning new object functions. Children spontaneously keep track of an individual's history and use it to guide subsequent learning without any prompting, and children's sensitivity to others' prior accuracy is not specific to the domain of language.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Boseovski & Thurman (2014)	3- to 7-year-olds (n=60)	Experiment	Younger children endorsed the zookeeper's testimony about the animal but touched the animal more readily when the maternal figure provided positive information. Older children endorsed the informant who provided positive information but showed some sensitivity to zookeeper expertise.
Bridgers *et al*. (2016)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=70; 32)	Two experiments	Children's causal inferences varied with the confidence of the informant and strength of the statistical data and informed their future trust in the informant. Children consider the strength of both social and physical causal cues even when they disagree and integrate information from these sources in a rational way.
Brink & Wellman (2020)	3-year-olds (n=60; 57)	Two experiments	Children trusted information from an accurate social robot over an inaccurate one, as they have been shown to do for human informants, and even more so when they perceived the robots as having psychological agency. Children can learn from technological devices (e.g., social robots) but trust their information more when the device appears to have mindful agency.
Brosseau-Liard *et al.* (2018)	2- to 4-year-olds (n=39) and 3- to 6-year-olds (n=57; 72)	Three experiments	Pre-schoolers preferentially learn from informants who have been accurate in the past, appear confident, or have had visual access to relevant information.
Brosseau-Liard & Birch (2010)	4- to 5-year-olds and 3- to 5-year-olds (n=49; 18)	Two experiments	Five-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, used an individual's prior accuracy at labelling to predict her knowledge of words and broader facts.
Brosseau-Liard & Birch (2011)	3- to 5-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds (n=50; 64)	Two experiments	Pre-schoolers can use situation-specific (e.g., visual access) and person-specific (e.g., prior accuracy) cues to infer what others know.
Brosseau-Liard *et al.* (2015)	3- to 4-year-olds (n=65)	Experiments	Performance on a theory-of-mind battery predicted children's preference to learn from more accurate informants but not from physically stronger informants.
Butler *et al.* (2018)	4- to 7-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds (n=48; 72)	Two experiments	Children evaluated verified claims as more acceptable than insufficiently verified claims, and that the extent to which they did so was related to their explicit understanding.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Castelain *et al.* (2016)	4- to 6-year-olds (n=99; 97)	Two experiments	When the power and reasoning cues conflict, reasoning completely trumps power.
Chan & Tardif (2013)	6- to 8-year-olds (n=128)	Experiment	Children endorsed more conflicting labels when they had weak prior knowledge about the objects. Relative to their Chinese peers, American kindergartners were more willing to endorse conflicting labels when they had strong prior knowledge about the objects.
Clegg *et al.* (2019)	3- to 7-year-olds (n=131)	Experiment	Children discounted their initial trust in an expert who provided low-quality explanations in a task related to the expert's area of expertise.
Corriveau & Harris (2009a)	3- to 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds (n=41; 20)	Two experiments	All three age groups invested more trust in the familiar teacher in comparison with an unfamiliar one. The 3-year-olds was minimally affected by this intervening experience of differential accuracy. By 4 years of age, children trust familiar informants but moderate that trust depending on the informants' recent history of accuracy or inaccuracy.
Corriveau & Harris (2009b)	3- to 4-year-olds (n=44; 42)	Two experiments	Both age groups preferred to trust the accurate informant not only immediately after receiving accuracy information but also at subsequent time-points (1 week later).
Corriveau & Kurkul (2014)	3- and 5-year-olds (n=33; 32)	Two experiments	Both age groups demonstrated a selective preference for learning novel explanations from an informant who had previously provided noncircular explanations.
Corriveau *et al.* (2009)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=147)	Experiments	Children's pattern of responding to new knowledge from mothers and strangers varied by attachment status. The strategy of relying on the mother or the stranger, depending on the available perceptual cues, was especially evident among secure children. Insecure children displayed less reliance on their mother's claims, irrespective of the available cues.
Corriveau *et al.* (2013)	3- to 5-year-olds (n=94)	Experiment	In the private setting, children were mostly resistant to the incorrect testimony from the consensus. By contrast, in the public setting, children were more deferential, less willing to explicitly judge the consensus members as incorrect, and more likely to misremember the consensus as having made accurate line judgments. Confirming earlier findings, deference to the consensus was greater among Asian-American children. First-generation Asian-American children were especially deferential in the public setting.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Corriveau *et al.* (2009)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=32; 33)	Two experiments	The pre-schoolers sided with the majority rather than the dissenter and remained mistrustful of the dissenter in a subsequent task. They preferred to seek and endorse information from the informant who had belonged to the majority.
Corriveau *et al.* (2011)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=16; 16) and 3- to 5-year-olds (n=32)	Three experiments	The majority of children chose the previously correct labeller when learning novel label and morphology and chose the previously correct morphologist when learning novel labels and past tense forms. Thus, children track both semantic and morphological accuracy.
Danovitch & Alzahabi (2013)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=41); 3- to 5-year-olds (n=51; 53)	Three experiments	Children relied on information provided by the previously accurate computer to identify novel objects and answer questions about unfamiliar facts.
Danovitch & Mills (2014)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=41); 4-year-olds (n=42; 20)	Three experiments	Children endorsed objective and subjective claims made by a familiar character more often than those made by a perceptually similar but unfamiliar character even in situations where they had evidence that the familiar character was unreliable. Children also preferred low-quality products bearing a familiar character's image over high-quality products without a character image up to 74% of the time. These findings suggest that young children are powerfully influenced by familiar characters encountered in the media.
Ding *et al.* (2022)	3-year-olds (n=80)	Experiment	Strategic deception training was effective in promoting epistemic vigilance on a semantic task but not episodic task. These findings provide the first evidence of a causal link between young children's reasoning about how to deceive others and their resistance to being misled by others.
Doebel *et al.* (2016)	3- to 5-year-olds and 4- and 5-year-olds (n=74; 120)	Two experiments	Presented with two speakers who expressed logically consistent or inconsistent claims: 3-year-olds failed to detect inconsistencies, 4-year-olds detected inconsistencies when expressed by human speakers but not when read from books, and 5-year-olds detected inconsistencies in both contexts. Children demonstrated scepticism toward testimony from previously inconsistent sources. Executive function and working memory each predicted inconsistency detection.
Durkin & Shafto (2016)	9- to 11-year-olds (n=122)	Experiment	Children's learning differed depending on informant reliability.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Einav (2014)	4- to 6- year-olds (n=103)	Experiment	Five- and 6- year-olds made majority-based inferences when the dissenter had no privileged knowledge but systematically endorsed the dissenter when he drew the pictures, suggesting that by 5 years, children are able to make an epistemic-based judgment to decide whether or not to follow the majority rather than automatically following the most common view.
Einav & Robinson (2010)	4- to 7-year-olds; 4- to 5-year-olds; 6- to 7-year-olds (n=80; 40; 48)	Three experiments	Six- to 7-year-olds evaluated as better and show greater trust in an informant whose previous errors were close to correct answer than one whose errors were more extreme in an animal-labelling context, whereas 4-to 5-year-olds did so only in a number context, where the magnitude of errors was more obviously quantifiable. Six- and 7-year-olds preferred to guess the answers themselves rather than accept the claims (both wrong) of either informant.
Einav *et al.* (2020)	8- to 10-year-olds (n=48)	Experiment	Children's error detection was good for all error types, however, they endorsed more answers from the accurate than the inaccurate webpage in the typos condition but not in the factual or exaggeration (semantic) conditions.
Elashi & Mills (2014)	3- to 5-year-olds; 3- to 7-year-olds (n=60; 102)	Two experiments	At baseline, children of all age groups preferred claims made by in-group members. After in-group members provided inaccurate claims, children were unsure who to trust. Only 6- and 7-year-olds showing a decrease in their trust for the inaccurate in-group informant. That said, older children were more sensitive to informant accuracy levels.
Fedra & Schmidt (2019)	3- to 5-year-olds (n=48)	Experiment	Both younger and older pre-schoolers accepted correct knowledge claims that matched observable reality, but that only older pre-schoolers reliably rejected incorrect knowledge claims that did not match reality (the speaker lacked perceptual access).
Fusaro & Harris (2008)	4-year-olds (n=24)	Experiments	Four-year-olds mostly agreed with the informant who had received bystander assent (via nods and smiles), suggesting that, in the absence of background knowledge, children use third-party non-verbal signals to assess the accuracy of conflicting labels. On subsequent test trials, the informants again made conflicting claims about novel object names, but in the absence of the bystanders. Children with more advanced understanding of mental states continued to display greater trust in the informant who had received bystander assent in the earlier trials.
Ghossainy *et al.* (2021)	4-, 5- and 6-year-olds (n=26; 29; 28)	Experiment	These results provide exciting new evidence of the development of epistemic vigilance, specifically children's ability to modulate trust in verbal testimony based on the presence of conflicting nonverbal behaviour. Not only do children show the ability to identify and preferentially learn from good sources of information, but also, by 6 years, children are able to judiciously lower their trust in adults who appear to be lying. Young children show a strong bias to trust what adults say. Instead, older children show heightened epistemic vigilance when confronted with an inconsistency between verbal

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

			testimony and nonverbal cues. Even more impressive, they correctly prioritize the truth-value of nonverbal information over verbal testimony in such situations.
Guerrero *et al.* (2017)	3- and 5-year-olds; 4- to 6-year-olds (n=36; 91)	Two experiments	Overall, the findings show that children's previous beliefs have more strength than their compliance with the authority represented by teachers, suggesting pre-schoolers' resistance – or indifference – to majority pressure.
Guerrero *et al.* (2019)	9- to 12-year-olds (n=96)	Experiment	Results showed that most children accepted the information provided by their teachers immediately after receiving it. However, a month later, children from both age groups were prone to return to their prior inaccurate ideas.
Gweon *et al.* (2014)	6- to 7-year-olds; 6-year-olds (n=42; 75)	Two experiments	Children accurately evaluate informants who omit information and adjust their exploratory behaviour to compensate for under-informative pedagogy. Children consider both accuracy and informativeness in evaluating others' credibility and adjust their exploratory behaviour to compensate for under-informative testimony when an informant's credibility is in doubt.
Gweon *et al.* (2018)	4- to 7-year-olds; 4- to 6-year-olds (n=184; 80)	Two experiments	Children are sensitive to over informativeness and understand the trade-off between informativeness and efficiency; they reason about what others know based on the presence or absence of common ground and flexibly decide how much information is appropriate both as learners and as teachers.
Jaffer & Ma (2015)	4- and 5-year-old (n=47; 47)	Two experiments	Four- and 5-year-olds preferred to endorse the testimony of a physically abled, non-obese informant rather than a physically disabled or obese one. After seeing that the physically disabled or obese informant was previously reliable whereas the physically abled, non-obese one was unreliable, 4- and 5-year-olds did not show a significant preference for either informant. Children have strong negative stereotypes of physically disabled or obese others and are biased against these individuals as potential sources of new knowledge.
Jaswal & Neely (2006)	3- to 4-year-olds (n=58)	Experiment	When 3- and 4-year-olds had no reason to doubt an adult's credibility, they were more receptive to the novel labels an adult provided than to those provided by a peer. When the peer had been more reliable than the adult, children actually favoured the labels that the peer provided.
Jaswal *et al.* (2008)	3- to 5-year-olds (n=24; 24)	Two experiments	Children endorsed information given by an informant who had earlier been correctly over the names given by an informant who had labelled the same objects incorrectly.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Johnston *et al.* (2015)	3- to 5-year-old (n=63; 61; 61)	Three experiments	Children were presented with two informants who provided conflicting labels for novel objects – one informant was competent but mean, the other incompetent but nice. When competence was described via prior behaviour (i.e., might be accidental mistake), children endorsed the informants' labels equally. In contrast, when competence was described via trait labels (i.e., predict future performance), children endorsed labels provided by the competent, mean informant.
Kinzler *et al.* (2011)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=23; 20)	Two experiments	Preschool-aged children demonstrated selective learning of non-linguistic information from native accented rather than foreign-accented speakers.
Koenig (2012)	3- to 5-year-olds; 3- to 4-year-olds (n=54; 18)	Two experiments	Children of all age groups appropriately judged looking, reliable testimony, and inference as better reasons for belief than pretence, guessing, and desiring. Children preferred to seek and accept new information from a speaker who was previously judged to use the "best" way of thinking. The findings demonstrate that children distinguish certain good from bad reasons and prefer to learn from those who showcased good reasoning in the past.
Koenig & Harris (2005)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=39; 42; 38)	Three experiments	In cases of conflict, information from reliable informants is preferable to information from unreliable informants by 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds. Both age groups displayed trust in knowledgeable over unknowledgeable speakers.
Koenig & Jaswal (2011)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=32; 32)	Two experiments	Children preferred the expert in a related domain but had no preference when the informants presented in an unrelated domain. Children preferred the neutral speaker over the incompetent one. Taken together, these results suggest that for children, expertise is not subject to a "halo effect," but incompetence may be subject to a "pitchfork effect."
Koenig *et al.* (2004)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=53)	Experiment	Children could correctly monitor and identify the informants on the basis of the truth of their prior labelling.
Kondrad & Jaswal (2012)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=64)	Experiment	Pre-schoolers are willing to overlook semantic errors that are close to being correct, but only when there is an understandable reason for the speaker's errors.
Kotaman & Arslan (2021)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=59)	Experiment	Children trusted the joker more than the teacher, suggesting that humour positively influences children's trust decisions.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Kotaman & Aslan (2023)	4- to 7-year-olds (n=52)	Experiment	Results revealed that children preferred significantly relative testimony over precise testimony. This preference did not change according to age and math level of children.
Kushnir & Koenig (2017)	3- to 4-year-olds; 3- to 5-year-olds (n=46; 32)	Two experiments	Children endorse new claims made by speakers who previously professed ignorance about familiar object labels, but not to speakers whose labels were previously inaccurate.
Kushnir *et al.* (2013)	3- and 4-year-olds; 4-year-olds (n=44; 16)	Two experiments	Children selectively directed requests for new labels to the labeller and directed requests to fix new broken toys to the fixer. Pre-schoolers take demonstrated causal ability as a sign of specialized causal knowledge, which suggests a basis for developing ideas about causal expertise.
Landrum *et al.* (2013)	3- to 5-year-olds children's (n=48; 67; 49)	Three experiments	Five-year-olds endorsed the relevant expert's claim and credited him with knowledge more often than 3-year-olds. Although children most strongly preferred the nice relevant expert, they often chose the nice informant had no expertise when the relevant one was mean.
Lane & Harris (2015)	3- to 8-year-olds (n=192)	Experiment	Children of all ages were more trusting of claims made by informants with relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, expertise. Children also showed greater acceptance of intuitive rather than counterintuitive claims. Together, children's trust in testimony depends on whether informants have the relevant expertise as well as on children's own developing intuitions.
Lane *et al.* (2014)	3- to 6-year-olds (n=95)	Experiment	Children who had a firm understanding of the appearance–reality distinction and those who heard informants mention that distinction were more accepting of the informants' counterintuitive claims. Thus, receptivity to counterintuitive claims can reflect conceptual growth rather than simple deference or conformity.
Lawson (2018)	4- to 5-year-olds; 3- to 5-year-olds (n=37; 92)	Two experiments	The composition of evidence samples was manipulated such that one sample included either a large number (n = 5) or a diverse range of exemplars relative to the other sample, which included either a small number (n = 2) or a homogeneous range of exemplars. Younger children consistently trusted the "teacher" regardless of the composition of the sample. Older children consistently trusted the informant who provided the large or diverse sample regardless of whether it was provided by a "teacher" or a "child." Four-year-olds considered sample size and diversity to evaluate evidence provided by informants.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Li & Yow (2018)	3- to 4-year-olds (n=100)	Experiment	Children expressed a greater tendency to override their initial judgments and endorse the unexpected testimony from a previously accurate informant than from someone who had consistently made naming errors.
Li *et al.* (2022)	3-, 4- and 5-year-olds (n=25; 25; 24); 4- and 6-year-olds (n=32; 32)	Two experiments	When categorizing single agents among many, children show better memory for their negative characteristics; and in a learning context, children show better retention of information communicated by more competent agents.
Liu *et al.* (2013)	5- and 6-year-olds (n=98)	Experiment	Children trusted informants who had previously tried to help others more than informants who had previously tried to deceive others, regardless of past outcome. In addition, children trusted informants with positive past outcomes more than informants with negative past outcomes, regardless of intention. This study revealed that when children are deciding whether to trust testimony, they take into account the informant's mental states but also give slightly greater weight to the informants' past outputs.
Lucas *et al.* (2013)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=136)	Experiment	Exposure to a language that obliges speakers to state the sources of their knowledge may sensitize pre-schoolers to informant reliability.
Lucas *et al.* (2017)	5- to 6-year-olds (n=50); 7- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds (n=50)	Two experiments	With age, children rely less on familiarity and more on expertise in their selective social learning. Five- to 6-year-olds preferred to learn from their mother. A shift demonstrated in 7- to 8-year-olds toward copying the expert. Nine- to 10-year-olds prioritized their own—partially flawed—causal understanding of the puzzle box.
Luu *et al.* (2013)	3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (n=144)	Experiment	Two informants provided conflicting labels for unfamiliar internal organs. In the accurate versus inaccurate condition, children sought and endorsed labels from the accurate informant. In the accurate versus novel condition, only 4- and 5-year-olds preferred the accurate informant, whereas 3-year-olds did not selectively prefer either informant. In the inaccurate versus novel condition, only 5-year-olds preferred the novel informant, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds did not demonstrate a selective preference. Together, 3-year-olds are sensitive to inaccuracy, 4-year-olds favour accuracy, and 5-year-olds are more trusting of the novel labeller than the inaccurate labeller.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

MacDonald *et al.* (2013)	4-year-olds (n=22; 20; 32)	Three experiments	Four-year-olds failed to trust reliable outgroup members over unreliable ingroup members. Children's use of reliability as an indicator of future credibility therefore appears disrupted when outgroup status and reliability are in conflict, even when group membership is arbitrary.
Mascaro & Sperber (2009)	3-year-olds; 3- and 4-year-olds; 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds; 4- to 6-year-olds (n=23; 121; 47; 61)	Four experiments	Children as young as 3 years of age prefer the testimony of a benevolent rather than of a malevolent communicator. Only at the age of 4 do children show understanding of the falsity of a lie uttered by a communicator described as a liar. The ability to recognize a lie when the communicator is described as intending to deceive the child emerges around 5 and improves throughout the 5th and 6th year of life.
McDonald & Ma (2015)	4- and 6-year-old (n=32; 66)	Two experiments	4- and 6-year-olds identified a formally dressed individual as more knowledgeable about new things in general than a casually dressed one.
Mercier *et al.* (2014)	3-, 4-, and 5-year-old (n=123)	Experiments	All age groups favoured an opinion supported by a strong argument over an opinion supported by a circular argument.
Nurmsoo & Robinson (2009)	3- to 6-year-olds (n=67)	Experiment	This study shows that children do not necessarily treat a previously inaccurate speaker as unreliable. Rather, they appropriately excuse past inaccuracy arising from the speaker's limited information access.
Palmquist & Jaswal (2015)	4-year-old (n=16; 32)	Two experiments	Informants demonstrate more generalizable knowledge were thought to be also accurate in more limited knowledge.
Palmquist *et al.* (2022)	4- to 5-year-olds (n=78)	Experiment	Children with better theory of mind ability were more likely to defer to the unfamiliar informant on the selective trust task.
Pasquini *et al*. (2007)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=41; 57)	Two experiments	Three-year-olds mistrust informants who make a single error, whereas 4-year-olds track the relative frequency of errors when deciding whom to trust.
Poulin-Dubois & Chow (2009)	16-month-old infants (n=49)	Experiment	Only the infants in the reliable looker condition looked longer at the incongruent than at the congruent search behaviour, suggesting that infants encode the identity of agents based on past reliability and implicitly attribute beliefs to others during the 2nd year of life.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Rakoczy *et al.* (2009)	4- and 5-year-olds (n=39)	Experiment	Children selectively learned novel words from reliable over unreliable speakers. Children also selectively learned other kinds of acts from reliable actors.
Reyes-Jaquez & Echols (2013)	3- to 5-year-olds; 3- and 5-year-olds (n=120; 64)	Two experiments	Similarity influences children's learning and that children's relative weighing of social cues varies with age—with younger children being especially focused on familiarity and older children being particularly attentive to similarity.
Robinson *et al.* (2013)	5- to 7-year-olds (n=34); 3- to 6-year-olds (n=86; 69)	Three experiments	Children may treat print as a reliable source of knowledge as soon as they can decode print for themselves, but not before. Younger children less frequently showed such trust in the reliability of information gained via print.
Ronfard & Lane (2018)	4- to 7-year-olds (n=120)	Experiment	Children continually adjusted their trust in the informant as they obtained more information about her accuracy. Relations between the informant's pattern of accuracy and children's trust were robust, neither mediated nor moderated by children's inferences about her intent or traits.
Sampaio *et al.* (2019)	4- to 5-year-olds; 3- to 5-year-olds (n=88; 97)	Two experiments	Children preferred the apparently well-informed adult to the less informed adult. Children preferred the information provided by a majority instead of the apparently well-informed adult. Children were more likely to endorse the predominantly accurate adult as compared to the majority.
Schillaci & Kelemen (2014)	3- and 4-year-old (n=37; 44)	Two experiments	Children were more likely to agree with the majority when majority and minority opinions were equally plausible, especially when the majority demonstrated an overt consensus. However, 4-year-olds actively eschewed the majority opinion when it was implausible. The current results indicate that expertise in a domain of conventional knowledge reduces conformist tendencies.
Scofield *et al.* (2013)	2- to 4-year-olds (n=48)	Experiment	When the accuracy and conventionality of a source are put into conflict, children preferred endorsing and imitating the unconventional but successful actor.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Sobel & Macris (2013)	4-year-olds (n=32; 39)	Two experiments	This study examined whether children used a speaker's accuracy about one kind of linguistic knowledge to make inferences about another kind of linguistic knowledge, focusing specifically on syntax and the lexicon. All 4-year-olds used the speakers' accuracy to guide how they learned novel lexical information and novel irregular plurals, but not how they learned novel irregular past tense forms that children often regularize.
Stengelin *et al.* (2018)	5- and 7-year-olds (n=95)	Experiment	Children were more likely to trust information spontaneously provided by the cooperative than the competitive partner, showing a capacity for detecting contextual effects on incentives. However, after receiving false information only once, they immediately switch to an untrusting attitude.
Terrier *et al.* (2016)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=88; 85; 53)	Three experiments	Children gave more weight to an epistemic cue (an informant with visual access) than to a social cue (a same-gender informant) when evaluating testimony.
Tong *et al.* (2020)	3- to 6-year-olds (n=1,283; 666; 299)	Three meta-analyses	Three- to 6-year-old children were more likely to trust knowledgeable informants and informants with positive social characteristics. Unlike 3-year-olds, 4- to 6-year-olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust.
Vanderbilt *et al.* (2018)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=88; 53; 26)	Three experiments	Young children have the capacity to use mental state information to make selective trust judgments and show more vigilance against individuals with poor knowledge than those with antisocial motives.
Vanderbilt *et al.* (2018)	3- to 4-year-olds (n=87; 64; 80)	Three experiments	Children link the accuracy of an author to the accuracy of that author's written work. These results suggest children approach both text-based and verbal information with epistemic vigilance and expect that if information from a source in one modality is unreliable, it is likely to be unreliable in other modalities as well.
Varró-Horváth *et al.* (2017)	12- to 15- month-olds (n=53)	Experiment	Infants are able to discriminate the reliable and the deceptive actions of adults, but they do not generalize their previous experience in connection with a novel person, who is treated as a new reliable source of information.
Wang *et al.* (2019)	5- to 6- and 7- to 8-year-olds (n=60; 60)	Two experiments	Older children endorsed statements attributed to a teacher over those from the internet. Younger children did not show differential endorsement of statements by any source. When the statements involved scientific and historical facts only, all age groups sought out and endorsed information from the internet or a teacher more often than from a peer.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Wiebe *et al.* (2022)	3- to 6-year-olds (n=76)	Experiment	Children across the age-range were significantly more likely to attribute knowledge to characters who had seen the boxes' contents. As well, across the entire age range, children's trust in informants' claims did not differ depending upon characters' irrelevant physical or perceptual disability.
Wu *et al.* (2014)	8-month-olds (n=16; 16; 17)	Three experiments	Social attention cues (e.g., head turning, gaze direction) have been shown to shape infants' likelihood of learning about objects and events. Ostensive signals (e.g., a face addressing the infant) often precede social attention cues. Experiments showed that learning was less successful when the ostensive signal (i.e., a face addressing the infant) was absent even if an interesting but non-ostensive social stimulus (i.e., flashing square) preceded the same cued events.
Yang *et al.* (2023)	3-, 4-, 5- and 6-year-olds (n=215)	Experiment	Children were more likely to trust informants based on accurate judgments and gave less consideration to group identity. Older children considered the accuracy of the informant's previous moral judgment for selective trust in the context of knowledge access while ignoring group identity, but that younger children were affected by in-group identity.
Zhang & Sylva (2021)	3- and 4-year-olds (n=35); 6- and 7-year-olds (n=33)	Two experiments	Older children attached more weight to visual access in the non-competitive context (between ingroup and out group informants) but they showed some sensitivity to informants' self-interests in the competitive context, whereas younger children did not show a clear preference for either of the two cues when making selective trust decisions.
Selective trust using child and adult samples			

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Clément *et al.* (2013)	19- to 45-year-old adults (n=41); 19- to 33-year-old adults (n=37) and 3- to 5-year-old children (n=99)	Two experiments	Both adults and children as young as 3 years old were significantly more likely than chance to choose the label suggested by the avatar displaying a happy face over the label suggested by the avatar displaying an angry face.
Fitneva & Dunfield (2010)	18- to 26-year-old adults (n=20) and 4- and 7-year-old children (n=60); 20- to 28-year-old adults (n=12) and 4- and 7-year-old children (n=24); 18- to 21-year-old adults (n=16) and 4- and 7-year-old children (n=32)	Three experiments	A single encounter is sufficient for 7-year-olds and adults to engage in selective information seeking (adults and 7-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, selected the previously correct informant) and trait labels (after assessing) enable 4-year-olds to do so too.
Guerrero *et al.* (2020)	7- to 8-year- olds, 10- to 11-year-olds, and university students (n=57; 57; 57)	Experiment	Neither children nor young adults showed preference for teacher or internet as information source. Moreover, accuracy did not have the expected influence either on the children's trust decisions or on those of the adults.
Hagá & Olson (2017)	4- to 5- & 7- to 8- & 10- to 11-year-old children & young adults (n=80); Same age group (n=80)	Two experiments	Young children were simultaneously more overconfident in their knowledge and more likely to revise their initial beliefs than older children and adults.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Lane *et al.* (2013)	3- to 6-year-old children (n=81); 18- to 79-year-old adults (n=26)	Experiment	Children and adults preferred to ask and endorse information provided by people who are nice, smart, and honest. Children younger than 5 years of age reported that people with positive traits were knowledgeable even when they lacked access to relevant information.
Ronfard & Lane (2019)	4- to 7-year-old children (n=66); 21- to 73-year-old adults (n=62)	Experiment	Both children and adults track the accuracy of an informant over time and use this information to update their epistemic trust in the informant, but they have different interpretations of the informant's traits and intentions. Children's impressions of the informant's smartness, niceness, and intentions became slightly more negative across trials. However, adults' impressions of the informant's smartness increased, whereas their impressions of the informant's niceness decreased, and adults nearly unanimously judged the informant to be purposely (rather than mistakenly) inaccurate.
Tenney *et al.* (2011)	18- to 22-year-old adults (n=33) and 5- and 6-year-olds (n=49); 5- and 6-year-olds (n=26; 24; 24); adults (n=114)	Five experiments	Both children and adults used information about confidence and accuracy to judge credibility. Adults discredited informants who exhibited poor calibration, but children did not. Children and adults may differ in how they infer credibility because of the cognitive demands of using calibration.
Epistemic trust in non-clinical adults			
Echterhoff *et al.* (2017)	Young adults (n=64; 50; 100; 128)	Four experiments	Tuning messages to the audience's attitude can overcome intergroup biases in intergroup relations.
Frenken & Imhoff (2022)	Adults mean age 38.89 years (n=280); Adults mean age 38.18 years (n=283)	Two experiments	Conspiracy mentality was associated with a generalized tendency to perceive others as untrustworthy, independent of facial trustworthiness, speaking to non-specific manifestations of mistrust.
Gierth & Bromme (2020)	Adult mean age 32.97 years (n=214)	Experiment	When biased sources misrepresent statistics to support a biased claim for their own interest, people are able to scrutinize the claim in front of them.
Gilbert *et al.* (1990)	University students (n=35; 20; 30)	Three experiments	Both true and false information are initially represented as true, and that people are not easily able to alter this method of representation.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Gilbert *et al.* (1993)	University students (n=71; 86; 161)	Three experiments	Both load and time pressure can cause participants to believe the false information and to use the false information in making consequential decisions about the target.
Hasson *et al.* (2005)	University students (n=20; 16)	Two experiments	Comprehending a statement may not require believing it, and that it may be possible to suspend belief in comprehended propositions.
Imhoff *et al.* (2018)	Adults mean age 27.81 years (n=273); Adults mean age 28.97 years (n=195); Adults mean age 35.16 years (n=464); Adults mean age 37.27 years (n=225)	Three experiments	People who endorse a conspiratorial mind-set exhibit markedly different reactions to cues of epistemic authoritativeness than those who do not: they perceive knowledge from powerful sources (e.g., sources with expertise) as less credible and information from powerless sources in a more positive way than those without.
Pozzi & Mazzarella (2023)	Adults mean age 37.19 years (n=108)	Experiment	Having good evidence in support of a confident claim matters more than actually saying the truth and asserting an accurate information does not make people trustworthy if one lacks evidence for it.
Schröder-Pfeifer *et al.* (2022)	University students (n=62)	Experiment	This study describes an experimental paradigm for assessing epistemic trust – it first asks participants to engage in public speaking and mental arithmetic in front of two evaluators and other experimental participants. Next, the participants were individually administered a questionnaire, which asked questions about participants' own behaviour and overall performance during the interview. Participants were then given standardized feedback about their behaviour and performance, which included information about aspects in which the evaluators were "trustworthy informants" (e.g., participants' objectively measured physiology) and "untrustworthy informants" (e.g., participants' mental states), and they were then asked if they wanted to revise their previous answers. Epistemic trust was operationalized as the extent to which participants were able to adequately modify their perspective on the basis of evaluators' trustworthy feedback. Social desirability and personality disorder traits using the Short Scale for Social Desirability (KSE-G) and the short form of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-16) were controlled. Most participants endorsed trustworthy feedback and rejected untrustworthy feedback.
Epistemic trust in mental health			

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Bincoletto *et al.* (2023)	Adults (n=301; 178 women; mean age=31.61 years, SD=11.26).	Quantitative (questionnaire)	Negative ageism was correlated with psychological distress and epistemic mistrust. A mediation model revealed that epistemic mistrust fully mediated the relationship between age and negative ageism, suggesting that changes in ageist beliefs that seem to occur with age are mediated by a mistrustful epistemic stance.
Bo *et al.* (2017)	15- to 18-year-old female Danish adolescents with BPD (n=25)	Quantitative (questionnaires; longitudinal)	Enhanced IPPA trust in peers and parents measured in combination with improved mentalizing capacity was associated with greater decline in borderline symptoms in 25 female Danish adolescents receiving 1-year structured mentalization-based group therapy, thereby pointing to a candidate mechanism responsible for the efficacy of the treatment.
Campbell *et al.* (2021)	Adults mean age 45.34 years (n=500); Adults mean age 44.34 years (n=705)	Two experiments	Both studies yielded three correlated yet distinct factors–Trust, Mistrust and Credulity–and confirmed the reliability and validity of the ETMCQ. Main findings suggest intriguing links between the ETMCQ and developmental psychopathology constructs and are consistent with thinking on the role of epistemic stance in undermining adaptation and increasing the developmental risk of mental health problems.
Jaffrani *et al.* (2020)	A family (two daughters aged 16 years and 11 years)	Qualitative (semi-structured interview; Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis)	Two superordinate themes are reported: pre-therapy factors contributing to epistemic mistrust and factors contributing to the development of epistemic trust. The findings highlight two critical elements in establishing epistemic trust: the use of certain clinical skills that help build a secure base within therapy and the possibility of trust being transferred from and to other professionals/systems beyond therapy.
Kampling *et al.* (2022)	Adults mean age 51.3 years (n=2,004)	Quantitative (questionnaires)	ACEs were significantly associated with lower personality functioning as well as higher scores for epistemic mistrust and epistemic credulity as well as lower scores for epistemic trust. Higher epistemic credulity and mistrust, and lower epistemic trust were significantly associated with higher complex PTSD symptoms. Including epistemic stance substantially increased the explained variance for personality functioning (41%) compared to ACEs as a single predictor (16%). Overall finding suggest that disruptions of epistemic trust have an important influence on personality functioning, and thus, might play a role in better understanding the implications of ACEs in those with PTSD symptoms.
Li *et al.* (2022)	11- to 17-year-olds (n=15)	Qualitative (semi-structured interview; Ideal Type Analysis)	Three distinct journeys of adolescents' experiences were identified. Some experienced a shift from epistemic mistrust to epistemic trust which seemed to be associated with the experience of therapy; other adolescents also showed a shift but did not consider it as an outcome of therapy; and finally, some adolescents reported continued mistrust over the 2-year period. Indications of a shift from

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

			epistemic mistrust to epistemic trust were associated with better psychotherapy outcomes regardless of treatment orientations.
Liotti *et al.* (2023)	Adults mean age 32.47 years (n=843; 445)	Quantitative (questionnaire)	Statistical analysis showed a three-factor hierarchical structure similar to the model proposed in the original validation, with some differences that suggest an influence of cultural factors in determining individuals' epistemic stance. The results corroborate previous theoretical contributions regarding the association between epistemic trust and psychological wellbeing, and between epistemic disruptions and higher levels of psychological suffering. Both Mistrust and Credulity were significantly related to the presence of childhood traumatic experiences, attachment avoidance and anxiety, lower levels of mentalization, lower abilities in emotional regulation, and higher levels of psychopathological symptoms.
Locati *et al.* (2022)	12- to 18-year-olds (n=131)	Qualitative (questionnaires)	IPPA trust and mentalizing were negatively associated with perceived stress and emotion dysregulation. Trust in fathers was associated with level of perceived stress, and epistemic trust in mothers with emotion dysregulation.
Locati *et al.* (2023)	Adolescents (n=447; 57% females; age range 12-19 years old; mean age=15.54, SD=1.98)	Quantitative (questionnaire)	In females, IPPA trust mediates the association between mentalizing and internalizing and externalizing problems. However, in males, mentalizing and IPPA trust display independent associations with psychopathology.
Nimbi *et al.* (2023)	Adults mean age 31.71 years (n=342)	Quantitative (questionnaires)	Higher levels of monkeypox fear were associated with higher levels of epistemic credulity, close-mindedness, anxiety, difficulty expressing emotions, and difficulty processing them.
Orme *et al.* (2019)	12- to 17-year-olds with BPD (n=322)	Quantitative (questionnaires)	Significantly reduced IPPA trust towards parents was found in the inpatient adolescents with borderline symptoms. Levels of IPPA trust in parents at admission did not moderate a reduction in BPD symptoms over the course of treatment.
Riedl *et al.* (2023)	Psychosomatic inpatients mean age 41.5 years (n=249)	Quantitative (questionnaires; longitudinal)	Baseline mentalizing level was neither associated with epistemic trust, nor with mistrust or credulity. However, decreases in epistemic mistrust and epistemic credulity and increases in epistemic trust strongly significantly correlated with improved mentalizing at the end of treatment.

Supplementary Table 1. An overview of each individual study.

Tanzilli *et al.* (2022)	Adults mean age 37 years (n=367)	Quantitative (questionnaires)	Maladaptive response patterns to pandemic restrictions were related to dysfunctional personality traits, immature defence mechanisms, poor mentalization, and epistemic mistrust or credulity.
Thomas & Jenkins (2019)	Males with anti-social personality disorders (ASPD) mean age 41 years (n=6)	Qualitative (semi-structured interview; thematic analysis)	In patient experiences of community based MBT, epistemic trust appeared to be the overarching concept that encapsulated all themes that emerged (i.e., the experience of the group, attachment, learning flexibility, individual sessions, and impact). The MBT group was seen as providing a safe, transparent, and flexible space enabling patients to explore different aspects and possibilities of their own and others' minds, which fostered their willingness and capacity to trust others as a source of knowledge.
Venta (2020)	Recently immigrated high school students mean age 19 years (n=100)	Quantitative (questionnaires; longitudinal)	Lower IPPA trust in mothers was associated with adverse childhood experiences and less adaptive acculturative learning.